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IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURrI 
OF THE STATE OF UI'AH 
FERN L. BADER, 
\ 
Plaintiff-Res ponrleil t, I 
Case No. 
vs. I 10691 
\VILLIAM A. BADER, ) 
Defendant-Appellanf, 1 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEl\JT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff, Fern L. Bader, 
against the defendant, William A. Bader, for a divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT 
The respondent was granted an interlocutory 
decree of divorce awarding her custody of two minor 
children of the parties, subject to visitation privileges 
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for the appellant, providing for child support and dis-
tribution of the property of the parties, and awarding 
her a lump sum to be paid in monthly installments by 
the appellant in satisfaction of her attorney fees, arrear-
age in temporary support, and in lieu of alimony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the decree of 
divorce as granted by the lower Court and the granting 
of respondent's motion on file in this Court for attor-
ney's fees in connection with this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is not 
entirely accurate, contains mathematical computations 
based upon these inaccuracies and certain argument 
and conclusions with which respondent does not agree. 
Therefore, respondent presents the following: 
The parties were married on December 6, 1958, 
at which time respondent was employed by the Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph Company in a 
responsible position, (Tr. 54). The respondent con-
tinued this employment for a year and half after the 
marriage, contributing all of her earnings toward the 
family expenses, which earnings when she was farced 
to leave her employment because of advanced preg-
nancy were between $80.00 and $85.00 per week, (Tr. 
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54, 62). At the time of the marriage she had three 
children by a former marriage. One of these married 
and left the home when she quit working, (Tr. 54), 
and three years prior to the divorce now being reviewed 
her former husband died and the remaining two children 
have each been receiving $97.00 per month from Social 
Security which has been applied toward the family 
expenses, (Tr. 53). That these two children, "were 
solely supported by the appellant during three years 
of the marriage", as stated in appellant's brief, State. 
ment of Facts, page 2, is nowhere supported in the 
record. 
The lower Court awarded the custody of the two 
minor children to respondent with $200.00 per month 
child support, and in lieu of alimony respondent was 
awarded $40.00 per month for two years commencing 
on January 1, 1967, to this was added $300.00 for her 
attorney fees and $196.27 to be paid in the same man-
ner, (Tr. 88). 
In addition to $504.68 which appellant received 
from the cash value of an insurance policy on the lives 
of the four members of this family, which he awarded 
himself, (Tr. 58), the appellant was given as a property 
award the property as enumerated in the appellant's 
Statement of Facts, page 3. His argument as to its 
value, such as a 28 foot trailer house at "Oh, possibly 
$400.00'', (Tr. 69), are his estimates of value and not 
necessarily the lower Court's in view of the appellant's 
testimony that he has been paying $65.00 a month for 
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four years on the loan which was obtained to purchase 
just part of this property, (Tr. 72) . 
Respondent was given as a property award her 
furniture which she brought to the marriage eight 
years prior to the divorce and also some burial property 
which she owned prior to the marriage, (Tr. 57), and 
a 1960 Chevrolet upon which was owing $950.00, (Tr. 
57). The Court also awarded her $935.13 in the form 
of tax refund checks payable to both parties, (Tr. 77 
& 80). 
Respondent was ordered to assume and discharge 
the $950.00 obligation of the parties due on the Chev-
rolet, (R. 36). Appellant, in addition to the satis-
faction of the credit union indebtedness which was 
incurred to purchase some of the property awarded 
him, and the payments for which are made by a deduc-
tion from his gross income and not included in his 
take-home pay, (R. 50), was ordered to pay obligations 
of $7 45.00 of which $550.00 is the balance due for storm 
doors and windows installed on the home which he 
was also awarded by the Court, (Tr. 59). 
Appellant's take-home net pay from American 1 
Oil Company averages $406.40 per month, computed 
by the Court from the last, or right hand, column of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, (R .. 50), by subtracting from 
the total $2,243.19 the $211.16 shown for the period ' 
ending January 2, 1966, and dividing by 5. His take-
home pay from the Bar is $23.50 per week, (Tr. 68), 
or $101.83 per month ($23.50 X 4-1/3). He also re-
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ceives $40.00 per month which is not taxable from the 
Veterans Administration, (Tr. 69). A total of $548.23. 
The remainder of appellant's Statement of Facts 
consists of erroneous mathematical computations, argu-
ment and conclusions which will be discussed in re-
spondent's brief under Argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE AWARD TO THE RESPONDENT 
OF $935.13 IN '¥ITHHOLDING TAX RE-
FUND CHECKS ENDORSED BY BOTH PAR-
TIES AND HELD BY THE COURT CLERK. 
In PINNEY v. PINNEY, 66 Utah 612, 245 P 
329 ( 1926) this Court held: "The division of property 
is a matter that rests largely within the sound discre-
tion of the trial Court. Unless it appears from the 
finding that the division made is not equitable under 
all the circumstances of the case, an appellate Court 
could not and will not disturb the order of the trial 
Court." 
Did the trial Court abuse its discretion in making 
this award to respondent? In deciding this matter the 
lower Court gave careful consideration to the division 
which had been made of the other property. 
Respondent received property which she had owned 
prior to, and brought into the marriage plus a 1960 
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Chevrolet which is not valued at $950.00, the balance 
due upon it. 
Appellant received all of the property acquired 
during the marriage. He received the home, two boats, 
their two motors, a 28 foot trailer house, a 1961 Ram-
bler Station Wagon, and four guns. In addition, he 
had terminated a life insurance policy on the lives of 
the four members of the family just prior to the divorce 
hearing for which he received $754.68 as its cash value. 
He had made the determination and had appropriated 
$504.68 as his one-fourth interest in that amount. 
Had respondent received these checks, they would 
have helped her to survive and enabled her to pay 1 
something toward her attorney's fees, however, they 1 
were ordered paid into the clerk of the trial Court. 
POINT 2. 
THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT 
THAT APPELLANT PAY RESPONDENT 
$1,456.00, PAY ABLE $40.00 PER MONTH, 
WITHOUT INTEREST, COMMENCING JAN-
UARY 1, 1967. 
The figure of $1,456.00 was arrived at by the lower 
Court by combining $196.27 for arrearage on temporary 
support, the twenty-seven cents getting lost in the pro-
cess of the computation; $300.00 toward respondent's I 
attorney fees; and, 24 monthly payments of $40.00 in 
lieu of any alimony. 
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There should be no argument about respondent 
being entitled to the arrearge in temporary support, 
since there was no dispute about its being due. In fact, 
good argument could be made that she was entitled 
to a judgment for that amount which would draw 8% 
interest if not collected by legal process or paid. 
The "$300.00 towards her attorney's fees, that she 
can pay the rest of it." (Tr. 78), could hardly be so 
unconscionable as to require reversal, in view of the 
testimony by respondent that she had been told her 
attorney's fees would be $450.00, and that she felt they 
were reasonable, which the record would support, since 
no attorney's fees had been previously. awarded but 
had been reserved until final determination of the 
divorce action. Especially is this the case, since the 
$300.00 was to be paid at the rate of $40.00 per month, 
the payments commencing more than six months in 
the future. However, on these two matters, as through-
out the entire proceeding, the trial Court, in its wisdom, 
saw fit to show appellant every consideration in spite 
of the inconvenience caused respondent, and on the 
latter issue, the distress to her counsel. 
With regard to the award of $960.00 to be paid 
respondent at the rate of $40.00 per month commenc-
ing January 1, 1967 (more than six months after the 
granting of the decree) , is this so unreasonable and 
unconscionable and such an abuse of the trial Court's 
discretion as to require alteration by this appellate 
Court? 
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This Court early decided in REED v. REED, 28 
Utah 297, 78 P. 675, (1904) that: 
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the 
amount thereof are questions the determination 
of which rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial Court; and, unless it is made to appear 
that there has been an abuse of discretion on 
the part of the Court in dealing with one or both 
of these questions, its judgment and orders 
granting and fixing the alimony will not be dis-
turbed." 
This Court has repeatedly followed and reaffirmed 
this doctrine up to the presenet date. BLAIR v. 
BLAIR, 40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19 (1912); ADAM-
SON v. ADAMSON, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 
(1920); and, WILSON v. 'VILSON, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
296 P. 2d 977 (1956). 
Respondent in this case asks the trial Court for 
an award of $75.00 per month permanent alimony. 
This she felt she was entitled to since, as a result of 
this marriage, she has given up a life as a successful 
business woman at which she earned, as appellant's 
counsel has so aptly put it, "an excellent salary". 
(Page 5, Appellant's Brief). Her children by her 
former marriage were all of such ages as to be able 
to take care of themselves to a considerable degree and 
to assist their mother in numerous ways in maintaining 
a home. She now finds herself with two small children, 
one 3 and one 5 years of age, who require her constant 
supervision and control. She is unemployed and her 
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ability to earn has been reduced to temporary work 
in a department store during rush seasons, (Tr. 62). 
However, while acknowledging that, "and he is getting 
rid of a wife cheap." (Tr. 78) , the trial Court made 
no award of permanent alimony so that appellant can 
in 24 convenient monthly installments of $40.00 com-
pletely shed the responsibility which he has toward 
respondent. This Honorable Court's attention is called 
to the fact that because of this appeal and the resultant 
impounding with the clerk of the lower Court of the 
tax withholding checks, respondent has had no funds 
available to her for her support and has been obligated 
to borrow funds for her maintenance during this appeal 
which will have to be repaid. 
POINT 3. 
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER FOR 
CHILD SUPPORT AND APPELLANT'S 
ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH IT. 
The trial Court awarded $200.00 per month for 
the support of the two minor children of the parties. 
At the trial and at the pretrial conference in chambers 
respondent asked for this amount and at no time was 
any objection made to this award. On the contrary, 
appellant seemed to feel a great amount of affection 
for these two children, as shown by the time spent 
by the Court in arriving at visitation periods suitable 
to him, and appeared to agree with the reasonableness 
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of this amount for their support. The two children of 
the respondent, by her former marriage, had for a 
3 year period during this marriage received from the 
government $97.00 each for their support. No conteu-
tion was made by appellant that this was too much 
money for their support and that he was receiving any ' 
benefit over and above the cost of their support. No 
objection to this amount of child support was made at 
the trial but it is now opposed in appellant's brief to 
this Honorable Court. (Although under the heading 
"RELIEF SOUGHT FRO:M THE COURT", in 
appellant's brief, an objection is raised, at no place in 
the "ARGUMENT", is any explanation made to this 
Court why the trial Court's decree on this matter should 
be disturbed.) 
Possibly this award for the children's support will 
allow them to be housed, fed, clothed, educated, and 
their medical and dental expenses paid. It will not 
permit them to be reared in grandeur. Their childhood 
will not be such as to permit them the luxury of two 
boats each, hardly any 28 foot trailer houses, and prob-
ably their home will not be of the quality of splendor 
requiring a $120.00 per month payment. However, 
because of the unfortunate position in which these two 
children are placed as a result of this divorce and the 
broken home, it can only be hoped that each of the 
parties to this appeal will do all in their power to pro-
mote their welfare. 
Can appellant comply with this obligation which 
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he has toward these two small children? It is submitted 
that he can, and it is to be hope that he will t 
Prior to the granting of this divorce defendant's 
monthly take-home pay was $548.23, as explained in 
the next to the last paragraph of the "STATEMENT 
OF FACTS", in respondent's brief. In addition to 
this amount he has an additional yearly take-home pay 
of $935.13, as the result of an improper declaration, 
from his withholding taxes. This amounts to an addi-
tional tax free incomeof $78.00 per month regardless 
of whether appellant chooses to correct his withholding 
declaration and receive it monthly or continue to use 
it as a savings account and receive it annually. Under 
the terms of the decree he will receive another $14.00 
per month due to the decrease in his hospital insurance 
withheld, (Tr. 85 and 86). These two items alone 
present appellant with a net take-home pay of $640.23 
each month. If it is possible for these two children to 
exist on $100.00 a month each, which must pay their 
medical and hospital expenses and their life insurance 
premiums, all of which are already paid for appellant 
by deductions from his gross earnings, (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1, R. 50), surely appellant should be 
able to live on the remaining net of $440.23. The re-
spondent will not be receiving that amount with which 
to support four children and herself. "The criterion 
for determination of support money is the need of 
the persons supported and the defendant's ability 
to pay." ANDERSON v. ANDERSON, no Utah 
300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946). 
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This Honorable Court's attention is called to the 
fact that the respondent has received nothing for her 
support and expenses since the entry of this decree and 
that she has been required to retain counsel to respond 
to defendant's appeal and to represent her in this Court. 
Under the provisions of Sec. 30-3-3, U. C.A. ( 1953), 
plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable sum with which 
to pay her counsel for his appearance in this Court. 
PARISH v. PARISH, 84 Utah 390, 35 P. 2d 999 
(1934) and HENDRICKS v. HENDRICKS, 91 
Utah 564, 65 P. 2d 642 (1937). 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this Honorable Court has re-
peatedly held that the trial judge has considerable 
latitude in matters of this kind and that his judgment 
should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at all, 
unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Nowhere in 
the record does it appear that defendant and appellant 
was unfairly treated, or that there was any abuse of 
the discretionary power of the trial Court. 
Respondent urges this Court affirm the decree 
of the lower Court and award to plaintiff and respond-
ent her costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for the use 
and benefit of her counsel. (This Honorable Court's 
attention is called to the Utah State Bar's Advisory 
Schedule of :Minimum Fees which prescribes the fee 
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of $500.00 for representing either appellant or respond-
ent in the Supreme Court of Utah.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD E. BAYSINGER 
Suite 414 
Walker Bank .Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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